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Abstract
We study a legislative assembly that chooses its agenda protocol endoge-
nously. We generalize McKelvey and Riezman’s (1992) seminal theory on se-
niority in legislatures, by allowing for a large class of ordinal agenda rules that
assign diﬀerent recognition probability to each legislator. We consider two
stages — the selection of agenda rules, and the decision making that transpires
under them. We predict that the agenda rules chosen in equilibrium preserve
seniority distinctions, disproportionately favor more senior legislators, and gen-
erate an incumbency advantage to all legislators.
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1 Introduction
Seniority is a characteristic feature of legislative institutions. Senior legislators typ-
ically take leadership roles, wield disproportionate clout in the selection of rules of
procedure, and are also influential in determining the proposals that ultimately come
to a vote before the assembly. The empirical literature in political science on the
U.S. Congress, beginning with Abram and Cooper (1968) and Polsby, Gallagher, and
Rundquist (1969), puts considerable emphasis on the importance of seniority as an
organizational principle for the conduct of legislative business. In seeking to explain
the legislative reliance on seniority, however, this literature emphasizes functionalist
collective purposes without giving due consideration to the goals of individual legis-
lators — career or policy.1 An appeal to the functions served by a seniority rule —
for example, the elevation of experienced legislator types to positions of authority, or
the economizing on time and other resources that would otherwise be devoted to the
contestation of authority — is insuﬃcient to explain how these considerations aﬀect
the choices of individual members and decisive coalitions. It fails, that is, to tell us
why it is in the interest of members of a self-governing group to select procedures
that bestow diﬀerential advantage on senior members.2
In the more analytical literature on legislative organization, McKelvey and Riez-
1For exceptions to functionalist arguments, see the Epstein, Brady, Kawato, and O’Halloran
(1997) and Krehbiel and Wiseman (2001).
2Functionalist explanations of seniority arrangements also plague the analysis of groups other
than legislatures. On seniority rules in traditional tribal societies, see Simmons (1945). On the
prominence given to seniority in labor contracts, see Mater (1940) and Burda (1990)
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man (1992) were the first to tackle this issue formally (although a more informal
development anticipating theirs is found in Holcombe 1989). Instead of oﬀering
functionalist reasons, they provide an explanation of the endogenous emergence of a
seniority institution based on the benefit it provides each incumbent legislator in his
or her pursuit of reelection. Granting diﬀerential power to senior legislators, allowing
them in expectation to obtain a disproportionate share of resources for their districts,
induces voters in every district to prefer reelecting their incumbent politician rather
than a newly minted legislator. A seniority rule, in eﬀect, begets an incumbency
advantage. Self-interested legislators, caring only about policies that benefit their
constituencies and thus that enhance their prospects of reelection, are inclined to
support some form of seniority.
McKelvey and Riezman (1992) restrict attention to a binary notion of seniority
in which legislators are either senior if they have been reelected at least once, or are
junior if they have just been elected for the first time. They recognize that, in reality,
seniority is ordinal, i.e., legislators are individually ordered from most to least senior.
Muthoo and Shepsle (2010) extend their classic model by allowing for the endogenous
choice of the number of terms that a legislator must serve in order to gain seniority,
but they still work under the binary restriction of seniority. They too recognize that
many seniority systems are ordinal not categorical.
In this paper we extend these models in several ways. We consider a game that
possesses two legislative stages — a rules-selection stage and a policy-determination
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stage. The first stage, occurring in a “procedural state of nature” (Diermeier, Prato,
and Vlaicu 2012), determines relevant procedural parameters. The second stage,
operating under the procedures just determined, is the place where actual policy
decisions are made. Our first extension is to derive an equilibrium in which a se-
niority institution is endogenously proposed by a selected legislator and approved by
the group in the rules-selection stage, instead of being exogenously given as in the
McKelvey-Riezman model. In particular, among all the ordinal rules that assign
agenda power to legislators in accordance with their seniority status, we find an en-
dogenous rule that emerges as an equilibrium in the rules-selection stage. This rule
involves three levels of seniority: some legislators, including the one proposing the
assignment of agenda power, are said to be “senior” and are recognized to make pol-
icy proposals with high probability; some others are said to be “semi-senior” and are
recognized with low probability; and the rest are “juniors” and are not recognized at
all.
A second extension of McKelvey-Riezman looks at a third stage of the game
in which voters in each constituency determine whether to renew their incumbent’s
contract or replace her with a new legislator. McKelvey and Riezman restrict voters
to a very simple class of strategies, allowing them to condition their actions on a
limited set of factors. Their result, therefore, is more a partial equilibrium result.
We show that their conclusions are robust to permitting voters a broader repertoire
of strategies.
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Third, we move beyond simple majority rule, developing our results in a q-majority
setting of supermajority rules.
In our initial development of the rules-selection stage, someone is selected to pro-
pose a set of procedures as a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. This takes the form of a
distribution of recognition probabilities for the first round of the bargaining stage.
(Subsequent bargaining rounds, if necessary, are governed by equal recognition prob-
abilities.) If this rules proposal is rejected, then an exogenous reversion set of pro-
cedures is imposed (equal recognition probabilities in every round of the bargaining
game). As a final extension, we allow the rules proposal to specify a distinct recog-
nition probability distribution for each bargaining round.
In the next section we provide the theoretical context. In section 3 we derive our
major results. In section 4 we justify the equilibrium we have selected from among
the multiplicity of equilibria that exist. Various extensions are taken up in section
5, followed by concluding remarks and additional comparisons to existing literature.
All proofs of results are in an Appendix which follows.
2 Theoretical Framework
Consider an infinite horizon dynamic game played between a fixed set of N voters,
one per district, and a set of legislators. We assume the number of districts is odd.
An arbitrary period is denoted by t. Let Γt be the game played in period t. This
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period game is played by 2N agents: the N voters and N legislators. Legislators are
strictly ordered by seniority. Seniority is defined as the number of period games that
a legislator has already played, with ties broken randomly to create a strict order.
Let Nt denote the set of legislators who serve in period t.3
The period t game has 3 stages, which we now describe:
1. Rules Stage
This stage contains three rounds. In the first round, Nature selects a legislator
according to an exogenously given probability distribution4. Let l(t) be the selected
legislator. In the second round of this stage, l(t) proposes an institutional arrange-
ment, at(i), in eﬀect a recognition rule indicating the probability of each legislator i
being recognized to make a proposal in the first round of the bargaining stage (see
below). Formally, at : [1, ..., N ] −→ [0, 1] is a function such that
NX
i=1
at(i) = 1. In
the third round, each legislator votes either in favor of proposal at, or against it. If
3McKelvey and Riezman assume that the set of N legislators is fixed forever: Nt = N for all t. If
a legislator is not reelected, she goes to the assembly anyway, only she loses her seniority and pays
a fine. Voters cannot get rid of their incumbent; they can only demote and fine her. We prefer to
assume that voters can replace their representative. Note, therefore, that the cardinality of Nt is
always N, but its composition may vary with t.
4We assume that this probability distribution either does not depend on seniority, or it is weakly
increasing in seniority. If, strangely, the probability of being selected to make a rules proposal were
decreasing in seniority, voters in a district may prefer to defeat their incumbent in some variants
of our model. To be precise, we allow the possibility that a more junior legislator is recognized
to make the rule proposal with higher probability than a senior, but it must be that the junior is
recognized by virtue of her identity as coming from her specific district, and not by virtue of her
seniority. For example, it can be that the legislator from district i is recognized in period t+ 1 for
any t that is a multiple of N, whether i is senior or junior at that time. This is the case of recognition
rotating among the districts. Recognition of the most junior legislator, by virtue of being junior, is
not permitted.
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a simple majority of legislators vote in favor, the outcome of this round is recogni-
tion rule at.5 Otherwise, the outcome is the reversion rule at = a¯ which does not
make seniority distinctions and recognizes each legislator with equal probability in
the bargaining stage, that is, a¯(i) = 1N for each legislator i.
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2. Bargaining Stage
Legislators engage in Baron-Ferejohn (1989) style legislative bargaining in which a
unit of wealth is divided. This stage has infinitely many rounds. For each legislator
i, the probability that i is recognized to make a policy proposal in the first round
ρ = 1 of bargaining is at(i); the probability that i is recognized to make a policy
proposal in round ρ > 1 (if bargaining reaches round ρ) is 1N for any i. That is,
we assume that the recognition rule approved at the rules stage can provide only a
transitory advantage to some legislators in the bargaining stage, an advantage lasting
for only one round of bargaining. If that first round of bargaining leads to failure, we
assume all legislators are recognized to make policy proposals with equal probability
in any subsequent round.
A policy proposal is a partition of the unit of wealth among the N legislators.
Observing the proposal, legislators vote it up or down by simple majority rule. If a
proposal is accepted in round ρ, the bargaining stage ends. If not, the stage moves
to round ρ + 1. We assume there is discounting at the rate δ starting at the third
5Our results extend to supermajority acceptance rules as we show in section 4.1.
6In section 4.2 we extend the analysis to multi-round rules-recognition procedures that do not
impose equal recognition probabilities after one round of bargaining failure.
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round, so the total prize for each legislator is discounted by δρ−2 if the proposal is
accepted in round ρ > 2.7
3. Election Stage
The voter in each district chooses whether to reelect her representative, or else to
elect a new representative from an infinite pool of identical politicians. If the voter
chooses a new politician, the new representative enters the assembly at the lowest
level of seniority. Incumbents who are not reelected exit the game.
At the end of the election stage, the period ends, each legislator (reelected or not)
keeps a fraction λ of the prize obtained by his district, and the voter in the district
obtains 1−λ. The game advances to the next period, with discount π ∈ (0, 1). The
game Γ consists of the infinite sequence of period games Γt.
For each period t, let τ ∈ {1, 2, 3} denote a stage within the period, and let
ρ ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...} denote a round within a stage. A history h(t, τ , ρ) contains all the
information about the actions played by Nature and all players in all periods through
to t− 1, in all stages of period t through stage τ − 1, and in all rounds of stage τ in
period t through round ρ−1. Given h(t, τ , ρ), let h(t, τ , ρ)|=t denote the continuation
history of play starting at the first stage of period t. Let H be the set of all histories.
We define a state variable θt, which is the strict order of seniority of all legislators,
where θit = k means that legislator from district i is the k − th most senior legislator
7It simplifies the expressions, without altering the intuition, to allow one round of bargaining to
go through without discounting.
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in period t. Let θit(h(t, 1, 1)) be the seniority of the legislator from district i in period
t, as a function of the history of play up to the end of period t− 1.
A behavioral strategy si for an agent i is a sequence of mappings, one for each
information set in which player i can be called upon to make a move. Each of these
mappings is a function from the history of play at this information set to the set of
feasible actions of agent i. We have already specified the set of feasible actions at each
information set: Legislator l(t) chooses a probability distribution (a recognition rule);
all legislators make a binary choice approving or rejecting this probability distribution;
then legislators engage in the standard Baron-Ferejohn bargaining game; finally voters
make a binary choice.
We are interested in subgame perfect equilibria of the game Γ that are stationary
as defined by McKelvey and Riezman (1992), so that each period game Γt is solved
independently of the history of play in previous periods. We call this Stationarity
I. That is, we seek equilibria made up of behavioral strategies that describe how to
play each period game conditioning only on information available within the period
game, as if at the end of each period all history were reduced to the state variable of
seniority status and all other details of past play were forgotten. Furthermore, we are
interested in the standard equilibrium strategies of the bargaining game that are sta-
tionary in the sense defined by Baron-Ferejohn; without this additional stationarity,
the solution to the bargaining game is indeterminate, as almost any outcome could
then be sustained in equilibrium (see Baron-Ferejohn). We call this Stationarity II.
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Definition 1 Given any player j, a strategy sj satisfies stationarity I if for any pe-
riod t, stage τ and round ρ, and for any two histories h(t, τ , ρ) and h0(t, τ , ρ) such
that θt(h(t, 1, 1)) = θt(h0(t, 1, 1)) and h(t, τ , ρ)|=t = h0(t, τ , ρ)|=t, then sj(h(t, τ , ρ)) =
sj(h0(t, τ , ρ)).
Given any legislator i, a strategy si satisfies stationarity II if for any period t, any
rounds ρ and ρ0 and any history (h(t, τ ,max{ρ, ρ0})), si(h(t, 2, ρ)) = si(h(t, 2, ρ0)).
An equilibrium is stationary if every strategy satisfies stationarity I and every
legislator’s strategy satisfies stationarity II.
The intuition of stationarity I, borrowed from McKelvey and Riezman, is that if
two histories lead to the same seniority ranking at the beginning of the period, then
in a stationary strategy an agent does not dwell on details of previous play in other
periods to decide how to play in the current period. Stationarity II is the standard
stationarity in Baron-Ferejohn bargaining, adapted to the notation of our framework.
It implies that looking only at the bargaining stage in a given period, given two
structurally equivalent subgames (two subgames with identical continuation extended
trees), agents play the same strategies in the two subgames; that is, if probabilities
of recognition do not vary, agents play the same way in the subgame that starts after
round 1 of bargaining, or after round k > 1 of bargaining.
As in most voting games, there exist many implausible equilibria in which all legis-
lators vote in favor of any proposal: since no legislator is pivotal in this case, legislators
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are indiﬀerent about the votes they cast. In a one-shot game, such equilibria are
discarded assuming that agents never play weakly dominated strategies, and always
vote as if they were pivotal. The analogous argument for dynamic games is to refine
the set of equilibria by requiring each voter to eliminate any strategy that is weakly
dominated in a given voting stage game considered in isolation while treating the
equilibrium strategies of all players as fixed for all future stages and periods. These
are “stage undominated strategies” (Baron and Kalai 1993). Eliminating strategies
that violate stage weak dominance is equivalent to requiring each agent to vote as if
she were pivotal in every subgame in which she is involved (Duggan and Fey 2006).
We use this equivalence to define the refinement.
Definition 2 An equilibrium strategy profile s satisfies stage weak dominance if for
any period t, any legislator i and any history h(t, τ , ρ) such that a (rule or bargaining)
proposal p is put to a vote, given s legislator i votes for p if the continuation value
for i of passing p is strictly positive and votes against p if the continuation value for
i of passing p is strictly negative.
Stage weak dominance merely rules out equilibria in which voters vote against their
strict interest because their votes do not count. Our solution concept is subgame
perfect, stationary, stage weakly undominated Nash equilibrium. We refer to these
equilibria merely as “equilibria.”
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3 Results
Let N−lt denote the set of legislators in period t excluding the rules proposer l(t). In
our first main result we show that a seniority-based recognition rule is an equilibrium
proposal at the rules-selection stage. The rules proposer, l(t), will assign most of
the recognition probability to herself, but will distribute the remaining probability
among senior legislators.
Proposition 1 There exists an equilibrium in which
i) In each period t, legislator l(t) proposes recognition rule a∗t (i) such that a∗t (l(t)) =
N+1
2N and a
∗
t (i) =
1
N for any i among the
N−1
2
most senior legislators in N−lt .
ii) In each period t, recognition rule a∗t (i) is approved by the assembly.
iii) In each period t, all legislators are reelected.
Other equilibria exist in which the rules proposer forms a minimal winning coali-
tion with a diﬀerent majority. We focus in Proposition 1 on this particular seniority
equilibrium first because it is arguably the simplest equilibrium: it possesses a focal
quality, with l(t) choosing from among her most senior colleagues as coalition partners
and endowing only them with the possibility of recognition in the bargaining stage.
We elaborate on equilibrium selection more extensively in the next section, providing
a political rationale. It should be noted about this equilibrium, that although dis-
tricts with incumbents at least as senior as the median legislator have strict incentives
to reelect them, those with an incumbent less senior than the median have only weak
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incentives to do so.8
We now provide another equilibrium in which, though slightly more complicated
and less focal, has the property that each district has a strict incentive to reelect its
incumbent legislator.
Example 1 Consider an alternative equilibrium: If l(t) is less senior than the me-
dian, she oﬀers recognition probability 1N to
N−1
2
legislators randomly chosen from
the set of legislators with greater seniority than l(t); if l(t) is more senior than the
median, she oﬀers recognition probability 1N to the
N−1
2
most senior legislators in N−lt .
In this equilibrium, if any legislator i has a positive probability of being recognized to
be the rules proposer, expected payoﬀs are strictly increasing in seniority for legisla-
tors less senior than the median. This follows because the prospect of having positive
recognition probability in the bargaining stage depends upon whether a legislator is
more senior than l(t); the greater a legislator’s seniority, the more likely she is more
senior than l(t). Thus, voters in every district have strict incentives to reelect their
incumbent.
Our model is richer than McKelvey and Riezman’s in that our formulation does
not restrict the strategies available to the players. In the McKelvey-Riezman model,
8As long as the minimal winning majority of legislators with positive probability of recognition
does not include the most junior legislator, a voter in a district excluded from the cake is at worst
indiﬀerent between keeping her incumbent legislator or electing a new junior legislator who obtains
nothing. Throughout we assume that if a pivotal voter in a district is indiﬀerent between reelecting
her incumbent or replacing him she reelects — hence the weak incentive referred to in the text.
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citizens can only condition their vote at the electoral stage on the policy outcome
in the current period.9 Voters cannot condition on past history, on their legislator’s
seniority, on their legislator’s vote in the assembly, or on any other action. Strategies
that make votes contingent on these factors are not admissible in McKelvey and
Riezman’s theory. Given these restrictions, we interpret their results as partial
equilibrium results: the equilibria that they identify are not shown to be robust
against all possible deviations, but only against the very small set of deviations that
are deemed admissible. Voters are forced to use very simple reelection strategies,
without it being established that these reelection strategies are best responses among
the set of all conceivable strategies.
We relax this restriction, allowing voters to condition on the whole history of
the game. In this new framework, new equilibria arise that could not be imagined
or constructed in the McKelvey-Riezman approach — the strategies comprising them
are either impermissible or do not exist. Example 2 below illustrates that new,
qualitatively diﬀerent, equilibria emerge if we allow voters to use more sophisticated
reelection strategies that condition on the actions of all legislators in the assembly.
This, in turn, raises issues of equilibrium selection, something we elaborate on in the
next section. Nevertheless, we show in our more general framework that the simple
strategies identified by McKelvey and Riezman (legislators institutionalize seniority
advantage and voters always reelect their incumbent) are robust against all possible
9See the definition of the voter game at McKelvey-Riezman (1992), p. 956.
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deviations; thus, they constitute true best responses.
Example 2 Suppose there are 3 districts, and the probability of recognition to make
rules proposals is 1/2 for the most senior legislator and 1/2 for the second most
senior. The standard equilibrium (Proposition 1) has the rules proposer proposing
2/3 probability for herself and 1/3 probability for the other senior legislator. In the
subsequent bargaining game, the policy proposer — one of the two seniors — gets 2/3
of the cake and, in expectation, the other two legislators get 1/6 of the cake (ex post
one gets 1/3 the other 0). Expected payoﬀs are 5/12 for the two senior legislators
and 2/12 for the junior one. Everyone is reelected, the seniors strictly, the junior
just weakly in the sense that the voters of the district are indiﬀerent between reelecting
and replacing.
Now, however, suppose voters use a strategy that reelects their legislator if she is
not the least senior, or if she is the least senior and the recognition rule for bargaining
gives her exactly 1/6 of the probability of recognition. The junior legislator then is
not reelected under an equal recognition rule, for example, because under this rule
her probability of recognition is 1/36=1/6. So she only votes in favor of a rule that
grants exactly 1/6 recognition probability for herself, and against all other rules (since
any other rule would mean her electoral defeat). That makes her a cheaper coalition
partner at the rules stage. Thus, the sequence of stages plays out as follows:
• With probability 1/2 a senior is recognized to propose a rule.
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• He proposes 5/6 recognition probability for himself and 1/6 for the junior.
• In the bargaining game, with probability 5/6 he is recognized and proposes 2/3
to himself and 1/3 to one of the others; with probability 1/6 the junior is recognized
and proposes 2/3 for herself and 1/3 to one of the others.
•Junior and rules proposer vote in favor of this rule, so it is approved.
The expected payoﬀ for each senior is (1/2){(5/6)(2/3)+(1/6)(1/2)(1/3)}+(1/2){(1/6)} =
3
8
. The expected payoﬀ for the junior is 2
8
. Everyone is reelected.10
Equilibria of this kind, in which voters use sophisticated reelection rules, compli-
cate their incumbent’s optimization problem. An incumbent’s objective no longer
reduces to maximizing the expected share of the pie obtained in a given period.
Equilibria with sophisticated reelection strategies do indeed exist, as the example
just given illustrates. But we do not find them very plausible — in terms of the abil-
ity of a constituency either to commit to so exotic a strategy or to communicate this
strategy to its legislator even if it could commit. If, instead, we select equilibria in
which voters do not use such sophisticated rules, then legislators solve the legislative
stages (rules stage and bargaining stage) myopically to maximize their expected share
of the pie, and it then follows that the expected payoﬀ must be 1N for
N−1
2
legislators
(any N−1
2
legislators other than the most junior, who must obtain zero to guarantee
that voters want to reelect their incumbent), and the rest for the rules proposer.
10Note that the expected payoﬀ to the district of the junior legislator improves with the novel
strategy described above (expected payoﬀ of 2/8 rather than 2/12).
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Proposition 1 and the examples thus far have allowed any recognition rule to be
proposed. The next result constrains the set of available rules. We now assume that
any proposed recognition rule governing the bargaining stage must satisfy a weak
monotonicity constraint based on seniority. For any two legislators i and j with
θit ≤ θjt , any admissible rule must assign recognition probabilities in the first round
of bargaining so that legislators with greater seniority (lower θit) are at least as likely
to be recognized as less senior legislators.
Definition 3 A recognition rule at satisfies the Weak Seniority condition if θit ≤ θjt
implies at(i) ≥ at(j) for any legislators i and j.
That is, we exclude those recognition rules that give a less senior legislator a
strictly greater likelihood of being recognized than some of his or her more senior
colleagues.
Proposition 2 Assume any recognition rule governing the bargaining stage must sat-
isfy the Weak Seniority condition. There exists an equilibrium in which
i) In each period t, legislator l(t) proposes recognition rule a∗t (i) such that a∗t (i) =
1− 1N max{0,N+12 −θ
l(t)
t }
θl(t)t
for any legislator i such that θit ≤ θ
l(t)
t , a∗t (i) =
1
N for any i such
that θit ∈
³
θl(t)t ,
N+1
2
i
and a∗t (1, i) = 0 for any i such that θ
i
t > max
n
θl(t)t ,
N+1
2
o
.
ii) In each period t, recognition rule a∗t (i) is approved by the assembly.
iii) In each period t, all legislators are reelected.
17
Furthermore, if all legislators face an equal probability of recognition at the rules
stage, the expected payoﬀ for each district in this equilibrium is strictly increasing in
the seniority of the district’s legislator.
To see what is happening, suppose the selected rules proposer were the most
senior legislator — θl(t)t = 1. Then according to (i) above, she would give
1
N of
recognition probability to the N−1
2
next-most-senior legislators, retain the residual for
herself, and give zero to everyone else. This assignment is consistent with the Weak
Seniority condition. If θl(t)t =
N+1
2
, i.e., l(t) were the legislator with median seniority,
then according to (i), she and each of her N−1
2
more senior colleagues would have a
recognition probability of 2N+1 and zero for all others. If she were more senior than
the median seniority, but not the most senior, she would give the number of legislators
with less seniority than her but necessary to make up a majority 1N of recognition
probability, divide the remaining residual evenly among those, including her, with at
least as much seniority as her, and give nothing to anyone else. Finally, if she had
less seniority than the median, then she would allocate recognition probability evenly
among all those, including her, with at least as much seniority as her and zero to all
those below her.
All of these recognition-probability allocations are driven by the maximizing be-
havior of l(t). Subject to the Weak Seniority condition (in all these cases recognition
probability must be weakly monotonic in θit) she gives: (i) all those with at least as
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much seniority as her — including herself — the highest recognition probability; (ii)
lower recognition probability to those below her but necessary to make up a majority,
and (iii) zero to those unnecessary to a majority and not of higher seniority than her.
This means that any vector θt maps into three seniority classes — seniors, semi-seniors,
and juniors (the first two combine when l(t) has less seniority than the median).
Finally, we underscore the finding that if the probability of selection to make a
rules proposal in the “procedural state of nature” is the same for all legislators, then
it follows that expected payoﬀ is strictly monotonic in θit — the more experienced a
legislator, the greater his or her expected payoﬀ.
4 Justifying Equilibrium Selection
In our model there are a multiplicity of equilibria and thus an equilibrium-selection
issue. We have refined away equilibria involving stage-dominated or non-stationary
strategies on general principle. Other equilibria, as in Example 2, are implausible
because of extraordinary commitment, coordination, and/or communications require-
ments. Nevertheless, among remaining equilibria we oﬀer some compelling positive
reasons to select the particular seniority equilibrium we have identified, in which
recognition rules assign probability of recognition only to senior legislators and to
the proposer of the rule. We argue that this equilibrium maximizes seniority advan-
tage, and we provide two intuitions for why rational legislators want to maximize a
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seniority advantage.11
Somewhat casually, by “maximize a seniority advantage” we mean that those leg-
islators we identify as senior or semi-senior — a majority in all — will seek arrangements
which, ex ante, maximize the present discounted value of their payoﬀ minus that of
the most junior legislator. Because both constituency payoﬀs and legislator payoﬀs
are monotonic in the share of wealth secured in the equilibrium outcome (no moral
hazard), constituents of seniors and semi-seniors are provided the sharpest incentives
to reelect their incumbent when this diﬀerence is maximized. Replacing their senior
incumbent with a newly minted legislator when the seniority advantage is maximal
imposes the largest costs on the constituency.
More formally, let φit(a∗) be the discounted value of the expected stream of future
payoﬀs for the constituents of the legislator with seniority i evaluated at the beginning
of period t, given equilibrium play with the sequence of recognition rules a∗. Then
the seniority advantage of legislator i is φit(a∗)− φNt (a∗). The average seniority
advantage, which takes into account the utility of every legislator, including junior
ones, is
PN
i=1
φit(a∗)
N − φ
N
t (a∗) =
1
1−π− φ
N
t (a∗), where π is the discount factor across
periods. The average or aggregate seniority advantage is maximized if φNt (a∗) is
minimized. We argue that if we introduce exogenous turnover, the equilibria that
11We should emphasize that our more general theoretical framework allows us to move beyond
the binary option (whether to have a seniority system or not) in McKelvey and Riezman. We
claim that, instead of an either-or choice, legislators will select a seniority system that provides
them maximal value, and we provide reasons why. This issue cannot be addressed in the McKelvey-
Riezman framework that permits only the binary options of having a seniority system or not having
one.
20
we select are precisely those that maximize aggregate seniority advantage.
The first reason to seek to maximize seniority advantage is to increase the prob-
ability of reelection. Imagine the prospects of an incumbent seeking reelection are
aﬀected by stochastic factors. For a variety of reasons, explicable and inexplicable,
a constituency may be “moody,” possessing an anti-incumbent sentiment in period t,
for example. Perhaps the most compelling stochastic factor is the nature of the pe-
riod t challenger whose identity is not learned by the incumbent until the last stage of
the game. The challenger selected for period t’s election may constitute an unlucky
draw for the incumbent — that is, he will possess electorally advantageous valence
characteristics (youth, telegenic looks, reputation for competence or honesty).12 If
the stochastic eﬀects — electoral mood, challenger valence — are large and unfavorable
to the incumbent, then she may lose the election. Ex ante, to produce a cushion
against adverse draws, incumbents will want to “stack the procedural deck”maximally
in their favor in the bargaining game. In particular, in making the payoﬀs to junior
legislators as small as possible in the bargaining game, the respective constituencies
of all legislators will be maximally punished if they replace an incumbent. For sure
in the seniority equilibrium we identify, that constituency will get a minimal expected
12Valence characteristics are those on which there is a constituency consensus that more is preferred
to less (or less is preferred to more), in contrast to positional characteristics (left-wing versus right-
wing issue positions) on which a constituency may be divided. Valence characteristics also tend
to be fixed features of a candidate (e.g., youth) rather than endogenously chosen ones (e.g., issue
positions) — what Spence (1974) called indexes rather than signals. The literature in political
science on the importance of valence in electoral models and voting behavior is large. A sampling
includes Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Aragones and Palfrey (2004), Enelow and Hinich (1982),
Groseclose (2001), and Stone and Simas (2010).
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payoﬀ in the period t + 1 bargaining. Moreover, by zeroing out the probability of
recognition of all juniors, it means a constituency that replaces its incumbent will be
required to wait the maximal amount of time, given exogenous turnover, before their
newly minted legislator rises suﬃciently on the seniority ladder to qualify for positive
probability of recognition and a greater than minimal expectation of payments. In
sum, an institutional arrangement that maximizes seniority advantage means that
the stream of future payoﬀs for the constituency of a newly elected legislator remains
very low for as many periods as possible, which is achieved by concentrating all the
probability of recognition on senior legislators. This maximally deters constituencies
from defeating incumbents.
There is a second intuition that rationalizes the selection of the equilibrium we
identify. Suppose, in contrast to the first intuition, that there is no stochastic ele-
ment in voter utility functions. Nevertheless, suppose there is stochastic turnover.
With some (possibly small) probability, an incumbent legislator “dies” (e.g., death,
elevation to high executive oﬃce, selection for a remunerative private-sector position,
criminal conviction). Let us suppose further that the share of the bargaining out-
come for his constituency that the legislator keeps, λ, is endogenously chosen by the
incumbent.13 In setting up seniority institutions in the “procedural state of nature,”
a senior legislator may extract (all of) the generated surplus for herself. Maximizing
seniority advantage through procedural arrangements thus facilitates “corruption”
13In our results, and those of McKelvey-Riezman, λ is fixed exogenously.
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(personal venality, directing funds or tax breaks or insider information to friends and
family, etc.). Stochastic dying provides juniors the opportunity to move up on the
seniority ladder while, at the same time, allows seniors to extract rents that are a
function of the diﬀerence between senior and junior bargaining outcomes. Legislators
will want to maximize this diﬀerence.
5 Generalizations
5.1 Supermajority Voting Rules
We have so far assumed that rules and policy proposals are selected by simple majority
rule. However, decisions to adopt or change rules are often subject to supermajority
requirements (Eraslan 2002, Polborn and Messner 2004, Barberà and Jackson 2004).
In the U.S. House of Representatives, for example, the standing rules are adopted at
the beginning of a new Congress by simple majority rule. If, however, during the
course of considering a specific piece of legislation, proponents wish to cut through
various procedural thickets dictated by the rules and move directly to a vote — that
is, to “suspend the rules” in order to pass the particular bill — then a two-thirds
majority is required. The U.S. Senate is nominally a simple majority rule legislative
chamber — it only takes a simple majority to pass a bill or confirm a presidential
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nominee.14 However, in order to proceed to a vote, debate must be brought to a close
(cloture), and this requires the support of sixty out of the hundred members. Even
more restrictive, a motion to proceed to vote on a rules change requires two-thirds of
those present and voting — that is, 67 votes when all senators participate.
Suppose q ∈
£
N+3
2
, N − 1
¤
votes are needed to approve at(i) at the rules stage;
otherwise, the equal recognition rule a¯ is the default rule in the subsequent bargaining
stage. The supermajority requirement forces the rules proposer to grant recognition
probability to more agents.
Proposition 3 Assume recognition rules are approved if at least q ∈
£
N+3
2
, N − 1
¤
legislators vote in favor, otherwise policy bargaining occurs under an equal recognition
rule. There exists an equilibrium in which
i) In each period t, legislator l(t) proposes recognition rule a∗t (i) such that a∗t (i) =
2q−N−1
(q−2)N+q ≡ x for any i in the subset of (q− 1) most senior legislators within N
−l
t and
such that a∗t (l(t)) = 1− (q − 1)x.
ii) In each period t, recognition rule a∗t (i) is approved by the assembly.
iii) In each period t, all legislators are reelected.
If we assume that feasible rules proposals are restricted to those that satisfy the
Weak Seniority condition, then the following result obtains:
14Some matters, however, are explicitly noted in the Constitution as requiring a special majority.
To expel a member, to convict an impeached executive or judicial oﬃcer, to ratify a treaty, or to
override a presidential veto, for example, it is necessary for the concurrence of two-thirds of those
present and voting.
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Proposition 4 Assume a recognition rule for the bargaining stage must satisfy the
Weak Seniority condition, and is approved only if q ∈ [N+3
2
, N − 1] legislators vote in
favor. There exists an equilibrium in which
i) In each period t, legislator l(t) proposes recognition rule a∗t (i) such that a∗t (i) =
1− 1N max{0,q−θ
l(t)
t }
θl(t)t
for any legislator i such that θit ≤ θ
l(t)
t , a∗t (i) =
1
N for any i such that
θit ∈
³
θl(t)t , q
i
and a∗t (i) = 0 for any i such that θ
i
t > max
n
θl(t)t , q
o
.
ii) In each period t, recognition rule a∗t (i) is approved by the assembly.
iii) In each period t, all legislators are reelected.
Furthermore, if all legislators face an equal probability of recognition at the rules
stage, the expected payoﬀ for each district in this equilibrium is strictly increasing in
the seniority of the district’s legislator.
Comparing the simple majority results of Propositions 1 and 2 to their q-majority
counterparts, Propositions 3 and 4, it is evident that l(t)’s payoﬀ declines with q:
he or she must distribute recognition probability to a greater number of colleagues.
Given two rules q and q0 such that q < q0, in expectation (before the uncertainty over
the identity of l(t) is resolved), any legislator at least as senior as q and any legislator
less senior than q0 is strictly better oﬀ with rule q than rule q0.
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5.2 Multi-Round Recognition Rules
The institutional arrangement at(i) that we have considered so far involves the selec-
tion in the period t rules stage of a distribution of recognition probabilities for the first
round of that period’s bargaining stage. If the bargaining stage moves on to a sec-
ond (or subsequent) round, we have assumed that all legislators are recognized with
equal probability 1N to make a proposal. That is, our results thus far have assumed
that there is an exogenously imposed default distribution of recognition probabilities
(equal recognition) for each bargaining round beyond the first if it is required. While
this simplified the analysis, we now relax this assumption. The legislator selected to
propose a distribution of recognition probabilities at the rules stage now is empow-
ered to propose a distribution for each possible round of bargaining, not just the first.
There now is no exogenously imposed default distribution of recognition probabilities
in rounds after the first.
Formally, once selected in the first round of the rules-selection stage, l(t) proposes
an institutional arrangement at(ρ, i), which consists of a proposal for recognition
rules in the bargaining stage. A recognition rule indicates the probability of each
legislator i being recognized to make a proposal in each round of bargaining; thus,
the recognition rule contains a countable infinity of probability distributions over the
N legislators, one distribution for each of the countable infinity of possible bargaining
rounds. Specifically, at : N×[1, ..., N ] −→ [0, 1] is a function such that
NX
i=1
at(ρ, i) = 1
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for each positive integer ρ.15
As in the benchmark model, legislators vote on at(ρ, i) and approve it or reject it
by simple majority, and if they reject it, the outcome is the status quo rule at = a¯ that
assigns equal probability of recognition in all rounds of bargaining. Thus, there is still
an exogenously imposed default if a rules proposal is rejected, but in the more general
case considered here, the default option gives an equal probability of recognition in
each required round of bargaining in period t; that is, a¯ is a vector of probability
distributions with each entry in each distribution equal to 1N .
With endogenous multi-round recognition rules, it is technically convenient to
allow two rounds of bargaining after the first (and not just one) to proceed without
discounting. It simplifies the expressions without altering the intuition.
The definition of Stationarity II must also be adjusted. Stationarity II requires
that legislators play two structurally equivalent bargaining games in the same manner.
With heterogeneous probability distributions in various rounds, two bargaining games
are only structurally equivalent if the probability distributions in subsequent rounds
are the same in the two games. Only in this case must agents play the same behavioral
15To keep the model tractable, we require that at(ρ, i) be such that there exists some K such that
at(ρ, i) = at(K, i) for any ρ > K.
Eraslan (2002) shows that under stationarity II, there is a unique equilibrium of the bargaining
game, even if agents have asymmetric probabilities of recognition, as long as these probabilities are
constant. Our analysis allows asymmetric probabilities as in Eraslan, but does not require them to
be constant for the first K rounds. Breitmoser (2011) shows that if the identity of the proposer is
deterministic for a finite number of rounds, and it varies across rounds, there are multiple stationarity
equilibria. Our analysis has the proposer chosen stochastically.
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strategies in the two games.16
If multi-round recognition rules are feasible, the rules proposer l(t) proposes a
rule that distributes all the probability of recognition and all the expected payoﬀ to
a minimal winning majority of agents.
Proposition 5 There exists an equilibrium in which
i) In each period t, legislator l(t) proposes recognition rule a∗t (ρ, i) such that for
any bargaining round ρ, a∗t (ρ, l(t)) =
N+1
2N , a
∗
t (ρ, i) =
1
N for any i in the set of the
N−1
2
most senior legislators not including l(t), and a∗t (ρ, i) = 0 for any other legislator i.
ii) In each period t, recognition rule a∗t (ρ, i) is approved by the assembly.
iii) In each period t, all legislators are reelected.
This result is not exactly about seniority, but rather, about the endogenous emer-
gence of asymmetric recognition rules that grant some legislators a greater probability
of being recognized to make a proposal. There are other equilibria in which the legis-
lator assigned to choose the recognition rules grants positive probability of recognition
to N−1
2
other legislators, and, as long as in expectation seniors are at least as likely to
get included in these coalitions as the most junior legislator, voters have an incentive
to reelect their incumbents.
Suppose now that legislator l(t) faces a more constrained set of options, so that the
recognition rules must satisfy the Weak Seniority condition. This limits the ability of
16Formally: Given any legislator i, a strategy si satisfies stationarity II if for any period t, any
rounds ρ and ρ0 and any history (h(t, τ ,max{ρ, ρ0})) such that at(ρ+ k,m) = at(ρ0 + k,m) for any
legislator m and any k ∈ N, si(h(t, 2, ρ)) = si(h(t, 2, ρ0)).
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a junior legislator endowed with the power to propose the recognition rule to expect
an extraordinarily disproportionate share of the unit of wealth that is subject to
legislative bargaining (as she could in the unconstrained circumstance of the previous
proposition). However, this legislator is still able to obtain a greater share of resources
than any other.
Proposition 6 Assume at must satisfy the Weak Seniority condition. There exists
an equilibrium in which for some z > x > 1N ,
i) In each period t in which θlt ≤ N+12 , l(t) proposes recognition rule a∗t (ρ, i) such
that a∗t (1, i) = z for any legislator i with seniority ranking up to and including θ
l
t,
a∗t (1, i) = x for any legislator i with seniority ranking from θ
l
t+1 to
N+1
2
, a∗t (1, i) = 0
for any other legislator i.
ii) In each period t in which θlt ≥ N+32 , l(t) proposes recognition rule a∗t (ρ, i) such
that a∗t (1, i) =
1
θlt
for any legislator i with seniority ranking up to θlt, a∗t (1, i) = 0 for
any other legislator i.
iii) In each period t, recognition rule a∗t (ρ, i) is approved by the assembly.
iv) In each period t, all legislators are reelected.
Furthermore, if all legislators face an equal probability of recognition at the rules
stage, the expected payoﬀ for each district in this equilibrium is strictly increasing in
the seniority of the district’s legislator.
The equilibrium recognition probabilities institutes a three-tiered seniority struc-
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ture, with legislators with seniority up to and including that of l(t) — seniors — recog-
nized with a high probability z, semi-senior legislators with seniority rankings from
l(t) + 1 to the median recognized with probability x which is greater than 1N but
smaller than z, and juniors not recognized at all. In the proof of the proposition we
find the exact value of z and x. As an example, if N = 43 and l(t) is the third most
senior legislator, the three seniors are recognized with probability .177 each, the next
nineteen semi-seniors with probability .025 each (greater than 1N ), and the twenty-one
juniors are never recognized.
We have considered two restrictions on recognition rules: equal probability of
recognition after the first round, and the Weak Seniority condition. We illustrate
the relevance of each restriction on the ability of the proposer to extract additional
surplus by the following numerical example. In the first two rows, endogeneity of
recognition probabilities is restricted to one round; in rows two and four, the Weak
Seniority condition is imposed. The top of the table (rows 1-4) reports the probability
of recognition in the first round of bargaining, and the bottom of the table (rows 5-8)
the expected payoﬀ in the equilibria described in propositions 1-6.
Example 3 Suppose N = 15, all decisions are taken by simple majority rule, and
legislator 5 is selected as rules proposer. Thus, legislators 1− 5 are senior; 6− 8 are
semi-senior; and 9− 15 are junior.
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Prob. of 1st round recognition
Cases Proposer Senior Semi-Senior Junior
1 1-Round (Prop 1) 0.533 0.067 0.067 0
2 1-Round, Weak Sen. (Prop 2) 0.160 0.160 0.067 0
3 Multi-round (Prop 5) 0.533 0.067 0.067 0
4 Multi-round, Weak Sen. (Prop 6) 0.159 0.159 0.068 0
Expected payoﬀ
Cases Proposer Senior Semi-Senior Junior
5 1-Round (Prop 1) 0.300 0.067 0.067 0.033
6 1-Round, Weak Sen. (Prop 2) 0.113 0.113 0.067 0.033
7 Multi-round (Prop 5) 0.533 0.067 0.067 0
8 Multi-round, Weak Sen. (Prop 6) 0.235 0.141 0.067 0
The takeaway points from the tables in Example 3 are the following. First, the
completely unconstrained proposer who need not observe weak seniority and whose
proposal contains recognition probability distributions for each round of bargaining
obtains the highest payoﬀ (rows 3 and 7). The introduction of constraints reduces the
rules proposer’s advantage, redistributing expected payoﬀ to seniors under the Weak
Seniority condition (rows 4 and 8) and to juniors when unequal recognition rules are
restricted to one round (rows 1 and 5). When both constraints are imposed, the
distribution of expected payoﬀs is more equal (rows 2 and 6).
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6 Discussion
Formal research on the origin of institutional rules that favor seniority in legislatures
begins with the seminal paper by McKelvey and Riezman (1992). They establish
the endogenous choice of a legislative seniority system, one that gives agenda recog-
nition advantage to senior legislators, as an equilibrium feature of Baron-Ferejohn
(1989)-style bargaining games in which participants make organizational choices at a
prior stage of the game. This formalizes an informal argument of Holcombe (1989).
Muthoo and Shepsle (2012) generalize their results, allowing for the endogenous de-
termination of the definition of who is senior and who is junior.
The political imperative that drives these organizational choices is an incumbency
advantage. Rather than taking the bargaining game as one in which each legislator
has a fixed likelihood of being recognized to make a proposal (as in Baron-Ferejohn),
legislative incumbents use their control of the rules and other organizational features
to assign recognition likelihoods diﬀerentially with the aim of inducing constituen-
cies to reelect their incumbents. They do this by selecting rules that make it very
disadvantageous for a constituency to replace its incumbent representative with a
newly minted legislator. However, these papers take a restrictive view of the menu
of organizational options available (and in this sense are partial equilibrium results).
For McKelvey and Riezman, the choice is between having a seniority system or not
(where seniority is defined exogenously). For Muthoo and Shepsle, the choice is be-
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tween having no seniority system or of adopting one and endogenously determining
who qualifies as senior. In both of these, once the class of seniors is established, their
members share recognition probability in a pre-assigned way.
The results of the present paper allow for a more nuanced set of organizational
options. We characterize the organizational choice as one of selecting the rule by
which an agenda setter will be chosen. An individual is randomly chosen to propose
such a rule — a vector of probabilities giving for each legislator the likelihood of being
selected to make a first bargaining proposal or, more generally, a sequence of proba-
bility vectors for making a proposal in each of the rounds of bargaining required to
arrive at a decision. This rule proposer is not constrained in the rule proposal he
or she makes (as is the case in the papers we identified above). We establish in our
first two propositions that a “seniority equilibrium” exists, one in which the randomly
selected proposer and other senior legislators share agenda power. Among the equi-
libria that exist in our formulation, after excluding those that fail to satisfy either
stationarity or stage undominance, we defend the seniority equilibrium we identify as
the one that uniquely maximizes the aggregate advantage of incumbent legislators.
We extend our results to supermajority voting rules and to recognition rules that al-
low for diﬀerential recognition probabilities in each of the required bargaining rounds.
Finally, an example illustrates the skewness of payoﬀs of the equilibria we identify.
In this concluding discussion we note other research papers that identify agenda
power and the selection of voting rules as key aspects of majoritarian decision making
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in legislative bodies. Early papers by Romer and Rosenthal (1978), Banks and Gasmi
(1987), and Harrington (1990) (along with the aforementioned Holcombe (1989) and
Baron and Ferejohn (1989)) make clear that agenda power aﬀects equilibrium out-
comes, showing that payoﬀs are skewed toward those possessing the power to propose.
They identify specific institutional features of agenda power that reduce the skew.
Harrington, for example, shows that the skew is monotonically decreasing in the vot-
ing majority needed to make final decisions. Baron and Ferejohn demonstrate that
allowing amendments to the proposal also reduces the skew. But in each of these
papers the agenda institutions are taken as given rather than chosen.
A number of more recent papers provide insights about specific features of agenda
institutions. Breitmoser (2011) examines the eﬀects of limiting positive recognition-
probability assignments to a restricted set of agents (e.g., members of a legislative
committee). In his model a proposal is made from one of T ⊂ N members, with T
known in advance. Any of the members of T may seek initial recognition or oﬀer
amendments to an existing proposal and, if more than one seeks recognition, they are
ordered in terms of seniority to initiate or amend. With these facts known in advance,
he shows that the first proposer’s payoﬀ is no longer unique for T > 1 (as is the case
in the standard Baron-Ferejohn setup), but his or her expected payoﬀ is higher than
in the standard case. That is, when proposal power is restricted, prioritized, and
these constraints are commonly known, the expected advantage to the proposer is less
determinate than in, but underestimated by, the standard model. In a similar spirit
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Fan, Ali, and Bernheim (2010) examine a dynamic Baron-Ferejohn bargaining setting
in which there is an informational connection between Γt and Γt+k — viz., at time t
the agents know the subset of agents who will have positive recognition probability at
time t+ k. In this circumstance they find highly skewed expected payoﬀs — indeed,
skewed in the extreme. However, in both of these papers, as in the earlier papers,
the details of the agenda-power arrangement are given exogenously. Thus, while
various agenda institutions can exaggerate or diminish the skew in expected payoﬀs,
we have no sense of whether such arrangements would ever have been chosen by the
legislature in a “procedural state of nature.” Indeed, our results suggest that before
procedures are established at all, each agent has an expectation of δ/N ; so they would
reject any agenda arrangement at the rules proposal stage that yielded them a lower
expectation.17
A diﬀerent strand of literature focuses on the selection of voting rules. Messner
and Polborn (2004) explain which voting rule is selected (once and for all) in an
overlapping generations context, when voters are aware that their preferences will
change in known ways with age. In particular, older voters are less inclined to support
policies with steep up-front costs and a distant payout than younger voters with a
longer horizon. Ex ante, a voter anticipates this change in his or her preferences
17A number of other contributions have this same flavor, focusing attention on some specific
features of agenda-setting rules. These include Gersbach (2004) on voting rules that depend on the
motion on the floor, Cotton (2010) on proposal power that is retained across bargaining periods,
and Diermeier and Fong (2011) that allows for reconsideration of an approved policy. The latter
paper has an extensive bibliography of related papers.
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and thus will seek to select a voting rule that maximizes the welfare of his or her
“average future self.” No explicit agenda-setting stage is modeled, so the origins of
substantive proposals is left unspecified. Barbera and Jackson (2004) distinguish
between an “ordinary business” decision rule, s, and a “constitutional” decision rule,
S, for making changes in s. They seek an equilibrium pair (s, S) with the property
that no s0 6= s is preferred to s by at least S voters. They refer to a pair with
this property as a self-stable constitution. Once a constitution is in place, ordinary
business consists of a binary choice between the status quo and a change. As in
Messner and Polborn (2004), agenda setting does not figure in this constitution — a
status quo is in place and an (unmodeled) alternative to it emerges in each period.
Agenda setting, and the endogeneity of agenda institutions, is central to our paper
and to a recent paper by Diermeier, Prato and Vlaicu (2012). They consider a
“procedural state of nature” (their term) in which a set of legislators — or any self-
governing group for that matter — selects the procedures by which it will conduct its
business. As applied to legislatures they note two stylized facts and regard them
as puzzles to be explained: (1) Why are procedures restrictive, granting asymmetric
agenda advantage to some legislators? and (2) Why are these procedures persistent,
that is, not (often) revoked by a majority? To address these questions, they build a
model combining features of Baron-Ferejohn bargaining and single-peaked legislator
policy preferences based on a one-dimensional spatial model. They account for the
first question with an appeal to risk aversion — symmetric recognition rules provide the
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expectation of centrist policy outcomes preferred by majorities (i.e., the median voter),
but is accompanied by undesirable variance. For the second question they appeal to
opportunity costs — time spent on revisiting procedural decisions is time taken away
from substantive policy making. These conceptual developments require additional
theoretical machinery (one-dimensional policy space, concave utility functions, costly
decision making) that specializes the argument, but nevertheless is well within the
spirit of the legislative modeling literature.
A major innovation of Diermeier, Prato and Vlaicu’s paper, and where it may be
diﬀerentiated from our own and the rest of the literature, lies in its ability to address
procedural commitment. In the play of the Diermier et al. game, after a standing
procedure is agreed to (an assignment of proposal probabilities to legislators) which,
in principle, may apply to all future policy decisions, a policy problem arises exoge-
nously but unknown at the time the standing procedure is established. Once known,
a majority may choose to “suspend” the standing proposal probabilities and devise
an ad hoc procedure just for this policy, but at a cost. The possibility of suspension
puts bounds on the standing procedure the legislators will select ex ante. Diermeier
et al. find that equilibrium procedures are asymmetric and persistent, thus provid-
ing an equilibrium explanation for the stylized regularities mentioned above. These
asymmetric and persistent recognition probabilities are “majoritarian” in the sense
that the median voter is part of the majority coalition supporting them. Their very
persistence — that is, the ex post unwillingness of a majority to replace a standing
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procedure with an ad hoc alternative — is a form of procedural self-enforcement. In
contrast, our model does not shroud the policy bargaining problem ex ante in uncer-
tainty, and while in our model an approved standing procedure cannot be revoked
within a period, the equilibrium agenda rule in period t in no way constrains legis-
lators in their choice of an agenda rule in period t+ 1. Stationarity, rather, implies
that they will select the same agenda rule.
Diermeier, Prato and Vlaicu identify the majoritarian procedural rules that emerge
in equilibrium in a legislature that bargains over ideological policies. We identify the
majoritarian procedural rules that emerge in equilibrium in a legislature that bargains
over distributive policies, and we show that these rules favor seniority.
7 Appendix
We begin with a useful lemma:
Lemma 1 Any equilibrium in which voters always reelect incumbents is such that in
any bargaining stage the policy proposer in the first round of bargaining keeps N+1
2N of
the cake and oﬀers 1N to any
N−1
2
other agents, and this policy is approved.
Proof. In an equilibrium in which incumbents are reelected no matter what, the
actions in one period have no eﬀect over expected payoﬀs in future periods, hence
each legislator seeks to maximize her period payoﬀ, conditional on reelection, which
means that each legislator plays the bargaining game myopically as if there were
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no continuation game. The probability of recognition is symmetric across agents
and constant over all rounds after the first. Hence, the subgame that starts with a
legislator recognized to make a proposal in round k ∈ N, including k = 1, is identical
to the subgame that starts with a legislator being recognized in the standard Baron-
Ferejohn bargaining game, and the unique stationary II class of equilibria of that
game is such that the proposer keeps N+1
2N and oﬀers
1
N to any
N−1
2
other agents
(there is no discount rate in this expression because discounting does not occur for
the first period).
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Assume first that each legislator is reelected in every period (we later show
that this holds in equilibrium). Since the equilibrium is by definition stationary,
assuming that all legislators are assured reelection on and oﬀ the equilibrium path,
the actions in period t have no consequences in future periods. Thus legislators seek to
myopically maximize their payoﬀ in this period. By lemma 1, the unique equilibrium
of the bargaining game in this case is such that the policy proposer obtains N+1
2N of the
cake, and N−1
2
other legislators obtain 1N ; let these legislators be randomly chosen.
Thus, the expected period payoﬀ for each legislator i is
at(i)
N + 1
2N
+ [1− at(i)]
1
2N
. (1)
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Given that the equal recognition default rule a¯(i) grants an expected payoﬀ in the
bargaining game of 1N to each legislator, in order for rule at(i) to be approved, the
expected payoﬀ (1) must be at least 1N for at least
N+1
2
agents, hence l(t) solves
at(i)
N + 1
2N
+ [1− at(i)]
1
2N
=
1
N
a∗t (i) =
1
N
for N−1
2
agents and keeps the rest of the probability of recognition to herself. This is
the optimal rule for l(t) among those that can be approved in equilibrium. Thus, l(t)
best responds by proposing it, and the N−1
2
agents who get probability of recognition
1
N best respond by voting to approve it. In particular, assume that l(t) oﬀers a
∗
t (i) =
1
N
for any i among the N−1
2
most senior legislators in N−lt .
Given these legislators’ strategies, the expected payoﬀ for a voter is weakly greater
in the seniority of the voter’s legislator. Hence, voters best respond by reelecting their
legislators.
We complete the characterization of the equilibrium by describing the actions
dictated by the equilibrium strategies oﬀ the equilibrium path. First, any deviations
in any period prior to t is ignored at period t; play returns to equilibrium play as
if the play had stayed along the equilibrium path. Suppose l(t) deviates to propose
recognition rule a0t(i) 6= a∗t (i). At ρ = 3, any legislator i ∈ Nt for whom a∗t (i) ≥ 1N
votes in favor of the proposal and any legislator such that a∗t (i) <
1
N votes against
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it. At the bargaining stage, the policy proposer ignores deviations at the rules stage
and plays as if along the equilibrium path, while following a deviation by the policy
proposer, any legislator i ∈ Nt who obtains at least 1N votes in favor of the proposal
and any legislator who obtains less than 1N votes against it in the first round of
bargaining (in subsequent rounds, the cutoﬀs to vote in favor are discounted by δ).
At the election stage, voters reelect their legislators, even oﬀ the equilibrium path.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Assume first that each legislator is reelected in every period (we later show
that this assumption holds in equilibrium). Since the equilibrium is by definition sta-
tionary, assuming that all legislators are assured reelection on and oﬀ the equilibrium
path, the actions in period t have no consequences in future periods. Thus legislators
seek to myopically maximize their payoﬀ in this period. By lemma 1, the unique equi-
librium of the bargaining game in this case is such that the policy proposer obtains
N+1
2N of the cake, and
N−1
2
other legislators obtain 1N (let these legislators be randomly
chosen). Thus, the expected period payoﬀ for each legislator i is
at(1, i)
N + 1
2N
+ [1− at(1, i)]
1
2N
=
at(1, i)N + 1
2N
.
Suppose θl(t)t <
N+1
2
. At the rules stage, agent l(t) maximizes at(1,l(t))N+1
2N subject
to two restrictions: (i) at(1, i) ≥ at(1, l(t)) for the θl(t)−1t most senior legislators, and
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(ii) at(1, i) ≥ 1N for at least
N+1
2
legislators. The two constraints are binding, so
at(1, i)
N + 1
2N
+ [1− at(1, i)]
1
2N
=
1
N
a∗t (1, i) =
1
N
,
and the unique solution is to assign probability of recognition 1N to
N+1
2
− θl(t)t agents
with seniority less than l(t), and
1− 1N

max{0,N+1
2
−θl(t)t }

θl(t)t
to legislators at least as senior as
l(t).The suggested equilibrium is one particular instance of this solution class, in which
the N+1
2
− θl(t)t agents assigned probability 1N are those with seniority θ
i
t ∈ (θ
l(t)
t ,
N+1
2
].
Voters are best responding by reelecting their incumbents because under these
strategies, senior legislators have a greater expected payoﬀ in each period than junior
ones, so there is no gain for a voter in making a legislator less senior, and the voter
thus best responds by always reelecting her representative. In fact, if every agent
faces an equal probability of recognition at the rules stage, the expected payoﬀ for a
legislator i with seniority ranking θit ≤ N+12 is
θit−1X
k=1
1
2N2
+
N+1
2X
k=θit
1
N
1− 1N (
N+1
2
−k)
k N + 1
2N
+
NX
k=N+3
2
1
N
1
kN + 1
2N
=
θit − 1
2N2
+
1
2N2
N+1
2X
k=θit
N + 4k − 1
2k
+
1
2N2
NX
k=N+3
2
N + k
k
,
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which is strictly decreasing in θit, specifically, it changes by
1
2N2 −
1
N2 −
N−1
4N2θit
−
1
2N2
N+θit
θit
= −3N+4θ
i
t−1
4N2θit
with an increase of one unit in θit, and the expected payoﬀ
for a legislator with seniority ranking θ > N+1
2
is
θit−1X
k=1
1
2N2
+
NX
k=θit
1
kN + 1
2N2
=
1
2N2
⎛
⎝N +
NX
k=θit
N
k
⎞
⎠ = 1
2N
⎛
⎝1 +
NX
k=θit
1
k
⎞
⎠ ,
which is strictly decreasing in θit, specifically, it drops by
1
2Nθit
with an increase of one
unit in θit.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Let Nt be the set of all legislators serving in the assembly in period t. Let A
be the set of legislators composed of l(t) and the q− 1 most senior legislators in N−lt .
Assume incumbents are always reelected. Since the conjectured equilibrium is
stationary and all legislators are reelected, the actions in this period have no conse-
quences in future periods. Thus legislators seek to myopically maximize their payoﬀ
in this period. Given the recognition rule a∗t (ρ, i), construct an equilibrium of the
bargaining game such that in the first round of bargaining over the cake, the pro-
poser j gets N+1
2N of the cake, and
N−1
2
randomly selected members of set A, each get
1
N , which is every agent’s continuation value in the bargaining game.
At the recognition rules stage, the status quo rule a¯(ρ, i) grants an expected payoﬀ
in the bargaining game of 1N to each legislator. Thus, in order for a recognition rule
to be approved, it must grant an expected utility of at least 1N to at least q−1 agents
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other than the rule proposer. Subject to this constraint, the best that legislator l(t)
can aspire to is thus a recognition rule that lets q− 1 agents have an expected payoﬀ
of exactly 1N and lets l(t) enjoy all the remaining surplus. Rule a
∗
t (ρ, i) delivers utility
2q −N − 1
(q − 2)N + q
N + 1
2N
+
µ
1− 2q −N − 1
(q − 2)N + q
¶
N − 1
2(q − 1)
1
N
=
1
N
to exactly q − 1 agents and the surplus N − q + 1 to l(t) hence it is approved with
the votes of all these agents, and it maximizes the expected payoﬀ of l(t).
We may now relax the assumption that incumbents are reelected oﬀ the equilib-
rium path; if they are not, legislators are even more worse-oﬀ so they do not deviate
from the equilibrium path in which they are reelected.
Thus, given the voters’ behavior, and given stationarity, legislators are best re-
sponding at every stage and round. It remains to be shown that voters are best
responding by reelecting their incumbents along the equilibrium path. They are be-
cause under these strategies, senior legislators have a greater expected payoﬀ in each
period than junior ones, so there is no gain for a voter in making a legislator less
senior, and the voter thus best responds by always reelecting her representative.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Assume first that each legislator was assured reelection. Since the equilibrium
is by definition stationary, assuming that all legislators are assured reelection on an
oﬀ the equilibrium path, the actions in period t has no consequences in future periods.
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Thus legislators seek to myopically maximize their payoﬀ in this period. By lemma
1, the unique equilibrium of the bargaining game in this case is such that the policy
proposer obtains N+1
2N of the cake, and
N−1
2
other legislators obtain 1N . Let the set of
legislators who receive 1N be randomly determined. Thus, the expected period payoﬀ
for each legislator i is
at(1, i)
N + 1
2N
+ [1− at(1, i)]
1
2N
=
at(1, i)N + 1
2N
.
Suppose θl(t)t < q. At the rules stage, agent l(t) maximizes
at(1,l(t))N+1
2N subject to
two restrictions: (i) at(1, i) ≥ at(1, l(t)) for the θl(t)−1t most senior legislators, and (ii)
at(1, i) ≥ 1N for at least q legislators. The two constraints are binding, so the unique
solution is to assign probability of recognition 1N to q− θ
l(t)
t agents with less seniority
than l(t), and
1− 1N

max{0,q−θl(t)t }

θl(t)t
to legislators at least as senior as l(t).
at(1, i)
N + 1
2N
+ [1− at(1, i)]
1
2N
=
1
N
a∗t (1, i) =
1
N
.
The suggested equilibrium is one particular instance of this solution class, in which
the q − θl(t)t agents assigned probability 1N are those with seniority θ
i
t ∈ (θ
l(t)
t , q].
Hence, if each legislator is assured reelection on and oﬀ the equilibrium path,
legislators would follow the equilibrium strategies described above. Suppose that
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legislators are not assured reelection oﬀ the equilibrium path; deviating from the
equilibrium path is then weakly less attractive to legislators, hence staying on it re-
mains a best response. Therefore, it suﬃces to sustain these strategies that legislators
be reelected along the equilibrium path, not necessarily oﬀ it.
Voters are best responding by reelecting their incumbents because under these
strategies, senior legislators have a greater expected payoﬀ in each period than junior
ones, so there is no gain for a voter in making a legislator less senior, and the voter
thus best responds by always reelecting her representative along the equilibrium path.
In fact, if every agent faces an equal probability of recognition at the rules stage, the
expected payoﬀ for a legislator i with seniority ranking θit ≤ q is
θit−1X
k=1
1
2N2
+
qX
k=θit
1
N
1− 1N (
N+1
2
−k)
k N + 1
2N
+
NX
k=q+1
1
N
1
kN + 1
2N
=
1
2N2
⎛
⎝θit − 1 +
qX
k=θit
N + 4k − 1
2k
+
NX
k=q+1
N + k
k
⎞
⎠ ,
which is strictly decreasing in θit, specifically, it changes by
1
2N2 −
1
N2 −
N−1
4N2θit
−
1
2N2
N+θit
θit
= −3N+4θ
i
t−1
4N2θit
with an increase of one unit in θit. The expected payoﬀ for
a legislator with seniority ranking θ > q is
θit−1X
k=1
1
2N2
+
NX
k=θit
1
kN + 1
2N2
=
1
2N2
⎛
⎝N +
NX
k=θit
N
k
⎞
⎠ = 1
2N
⎛
⎝1 +
NX
k=θit
1
k
⎞
⎠ ,
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which is strictly decreasing in θit, specifically, it drops by
1
2Nθit
with an increase of one
unit in θit.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Take the voters’ behavior as given. Since the conjectured equilibrium is
stationary and all legislators are reelected, the actions in this period have no conse-
quences in future periods. Thus legislators seek to myopically maximize their payoﬀ
in this period. Given the recognition rule a∗t (ρ, i), equilibrium play of the bargaining
game involves forming a coalition at the first round between the proposer who gets the
whole unit of wealth, and the N−1
2
junior legislators other than l(t) who get nothing.
Expected payoﬀs thus correspond exactly to the recognition probabilities.
At the recognition rules stage, the status quo a¯(ρ, i) grants an expected payoﬀ in
the bargaining game of 1N to each legislator. Thus, in order to have recognition rule
a∗t (ρ, i) approved, legislator l must grant an expected payoﬀ in the bargaining game
of at least 1N to at least
N−1
2
other legislators. The best that legislator l(t) can aspire
to is thus a recognition rule that lets l(t) have an expected payoﬀ of 1− 1N
N−1
2
= N+1
2N .
Rule a∗t (ρ, i) achieves just that, and is approved with the favorable votes of exactly
N+1
2
agents.
Thus, given the voters’ behavior, and given stationarity, legislators are best re-
sponding at every stage and substage. It remains to be shown that voters are best
responding by reelecting their incumbents. Which they are, because under these
strategies, senior legislators have a greater expected payoﬀ in each period than junior
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ones, so there is no gain for a voter in making a legislator less senior, and the voter
thus best responds by always reelecting her representative.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. We complete the description of the equilibrium recognition rule a∗t (ρ, i) as
follows. In each period t in which θlt ≤ N+12 , l(t) proposes a∗t (2, i) =
2
N+3 for any
legislator i with seniority ranking up to N+3
2
; a∗t (2, i) = 0 for any other legislator i;
and a∗t (ρ, k) = 1 for some k 6= l(t) and a∗t (ρ, i) = 0 for any i 6= k, for any ρ ≥ 3. In
each period t in which θlt ≥ N+32 , l(t) proposes a∗t (2, i) =
2
N+3 for i = l(t) and any
legislator i with seniority ranking up to N+1
2
, a∗t (2, i) = 0 for any other legislator i;
and a∗t (ρ, k) = 1 for some k 6= l(t) and a∗t (ρ, i) = 0 for any i 6= k, for any ρ ≥ 3.
Take the voters’ behavior as given. Since the conjectured equilibrium is stationary
and all legislators are reelected, the actions in this period have no consequences in
future periods. Thus legislators seek to myopically maximize their payoﬀ in this
period.
i) Consider first the periods in which θlt ≤ N+12 .
Given the recognition rules a∗t (ρ, i), if the bargaining stage reaches the third round
of bargaining, legislator k gets all the cake. That means the continuation value in
round two for every other agent is zero, so the proposer in round two gets to keep all
the cake. So in round one, the continuation value of every agent is equal to the agent’s
recognition probability in round two. There are N−3
2
with continuation value zero at
round one, and they always vote in favor of any proposal. The policy proposer needs
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one more agent supporting her proposal, and she needs to oﬀer N+3
2
to this agent.
In the equilibrium we construct, it is always l(t) who is selected by other proposers;
this may be seen as the limit case in which l(t) granted herself an epsilon smaller
recognition probability in the second round so that she would always be included
in the first round. Thus in the first round, the proposer oﬀers their expected value
of the continuation game to exactly N−1
2
agents, namely l(t) who gets 2N+3 and to
N−3
2
legislators who get nothing. If l(t) is the proposer, she randomly chooses one of
the agents with seniority from θlt + 1 to
N+1
2
and oﬀers her 2N+3 . Thus proposals are
approved with the votes of these agents and the proposer who keeps N+1N+3 for herself.
At the rules proposal stage:
Let x be the probability of recognition of any legislator with seniority ranking from
θlt+1 to
N+1
2
. Let z be the probability of recognition of legislators with seniority rank-
ing up to θlt. Legislators with seniority ranking from θ
l
t + 1 through
N+1
2
collectively
have a probability of recognition x(N+1
2
− θlt), leaving legislators with ranking up to
θlt with 1− x(N+12 − θ
l
t) so that z =
1
θlt
+ x
³
2θlt−N−1
2θlt
´
= 2+2θ
l
tx−(N+1)x
2θlt
.
Then the expected payoﬀ in the first round of bargaining for a legislator with
seniority ranking from θlt + 1 to
N+1
2
is xN+1N+3 +
2−(N+1)x+2θltx
2θlt
1
N+1
2
−θlt
2
N+3 , where the
first term corresponds to the probability that i is a proposer, and the second to the
probability that l(t) is a proposer and chooses i as a coalition partner. This must be
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equal to 1N to make the legislator support the recognition rule.
x
N + 1
N + 3
+
2− (N + 1)x+ 2θltx
2θlt
2
N + 1− 2θlt
2
N + 3
=
1
N
x(N + 1) +
4− 2(N + 1)x+ 4θltx
θlt(N + 1− 2θlt)
=
N + 3
N
x(N + 1) +
4θltx− 2(N + 1)x
θlt(N + 1− 2θlt)
+
4
θlt(N + 1− 2θlt)
=
N + 3
N
x
∙
N + 1 +
4θlt − 2(N + 1)
θlt(N + 1− 2θlt)
¸
=
N + 3
N
− 4
θlt(N + 1− 2θlt)
x =
N+3
N −
4
θlt(N+1−2θlt)
N + 1 + 4θ
l
t−2(N+1)
θlt(N+1−2θlt)
=
(N+3)θlt(N+1−2θlt)−4N
θlt(N+1−2θlt)N
4θlt−2(N+1)+(N+1)θlt(N+1−2θlt)
θlt(N+1−2θlt)
=
(N + 3)θlt(N + 1− 2θlt)− 4N
4Nθlt − 2N(N + 1) +N(N + 1)θlt(N + 1− 2θlt)
Thus
z =
1
θlt
+
(N + 3)θlt(N + 1− 2θlt)− 4N
4Nθlt − 2N(N + 1) +N(N + 1)θlt(N + 1− 2θlt)
µ
2θlt −N − 1
2θlt
¶
and z − x = 1
θlt
− x(N+1
2θlt
) so z − x ≥ 0 if x ≤ 2N+1 , much must hold, because if
x ≥ 2N+1 , then the utility for the agents assigned probability of recognition x would
be greater than 2N+1
N+1
N+3 =
2
N+3 >
1
N for any N > 3, a contradiction.
These probabilities of recognition imply that legislators with seniority ranking up
to θlt− 1 enter the bargaining game with an expected payoﬀ of zN+1N+3 , legislators with
seniority ranking from θlt + 1 to
N+1
2
with an expected payoﬀ of 1N and legislator l(t)
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with an expected payoﬀ of zN+1N+3 + (1 − z)
2
N+3 . The aggregate expected payoﬀ for
legislators with seniority ranking 1 through θlt − 1 is
1− zN + 1
N + 3
− (1− z) 2
N + 3
−
µ
N + 1
2
− θlt
¶
1
N
We need to show that this aggregate is at least θ
l
t−1
N .
1− zN + 1
N + 3
− (1− z) 2
N + 3
−
µ
N + 1
2
− θlt
¶
1
N
≥ θ
l
t − 1
N
2N(N + 3)− 2N(N + 1)z − 2N + 2Nz − (N + 1)(N + 3) + 2(N + 3)θlt
2N(N + 3)
≥ 2(N + 3)θ
l
t − 2(N + 3)
2N(N + 3)
(N + 1)(N + 3)− 2N(N)z − 2N ≥ 0
N2 + 2N + 4 ≥ 2N2z
z ≤ N
2 + 2N + 4
2N2
.
The right hand side is always above 1
2
, and z must be below 1
2
if θlt > 1. Thus,
agents 1 through θlt − 1 have an expected payoﬀ of at least 1N as desired.
The status quo a¯(ρ, i) grants an expected payoﬀ in the bargaining game of 1N to
each legislator. Thus, in order to have recognition rule a∗t (ρ, i) approved, legislator
l(t) must grant an expected payoﬀ in the bargaining game of at least 1N to at least
N−1
2
other legislators. Legislator l(t) successfully minimizes the expected share of
the unit of wealth obtained by legislators with seniority ranking θlt + 1 to
N+1
2
to 1N .
Legislator l(t) cannot minimize the share obtained by her seniors so much, because
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they are protected by the constraint that their proposal power in the first stage be
at least as high as that of l(t). Thus, the most that l(t) can hope for is to maximize
her expected continuation value subject to always being included in the coalition
put together by the agent that is chosen to make the proposal at the first round of
bargaining. This is achieved by maximizing the continuation value of the agent with
N−1
2
-th lowest continuation value, and making l(t) be that agent, which is exactly
what a∗t does by minimizing the continuation value of
N−3
2
to zero, and equalizing
the continuation value of all other agents, and assuming that all proposers break
indiﬀerence by choosing to oﬀer her continuation value to l(t) in the first bargaining
round, and not to any of the other agents.
Thus, recognition rule a∗t is the rule that maximizes the utility of agent l(t) with
seniority ranking θlt ≤ N+12 among the set of recognition rules that can be approved
by the assembly.
ii) Consider the periods in which θlt >
N+1
2
.
As before, if the bargaining game enters the third round, k gets all the cake, so
if it enters the second round, whoever is the policy proposer in this round gets all
the cake, so in the first round the continuation value for each of the N+3
2
agents
with equal recognition probability is 2N+3 . The agent who makes a policy proposal
in the first round must oﬀer 2N+3 to one of those
N+3
2
agents. In the equilibrium we
construct, each agent other than l(t) chooses l(t) with probability 1− N+3
2
p and each
of the other agents with probability p, while l(t) randomizes among all agents up to
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when she is the proposer. Then, the expected payoﬀ in the bargaining game of each
legislator with seniority up to N+1
2
is 1
θlt
N+1
N+3 +
1
θlt
1
N+1
2
N+3 + p(1 −
2
θlt
) 2N+3 , where the
first term corresponds to the case when the agent is the proposer, the second to the
case that l(t) is the proposer, and the third to the case where any other legislator
is the proposer. We assume that the equilibrium played is such that it minimizes p
subject to 1
θlt
N+1
N+3 +
1
θlt
1
N+1
2
N+3 + p(1−
2
θlt
) 2N+3 ≥
1
N .
Legislators with seniority ranking from N+3
2
to θlt obtain nothing if they are not
the proposer; their expected payoﬀ is 1
θlt
N+1
N+3 . Legislator l(t) obtains the rest of the
share.
Since at least N+1
2
obtain an expected payoﬀ in the bargaining game of at least
1
N under recognition rule a
∗
t (ρ, i), the recognition rule is approved. By the same logic
as in the previous case, we note that a∗t (ρ, i) grants legislator l(t) the highest possible
expected payoﬀ in the bargaining game subject to the double constraint that the
recognition rule must be approved by the assembly (which binds if θlt ≥ N − 1 in
which case p > 0 and the expected payoﬀ of the most senior legislators is 1N ) and
the constraint that recognition rules in the first round must be weakly increasing in
seniority (which is always binding).
Thus, given the voters’ behavior, and given stationarity, legislators are best re-
sponding at every stage and substage. It remains to be shown that voters are best
responding by reelecting their incumbents. They are, because under these strategies
senior legislators have a greater expected payoﬀ in each period than junior ones, so
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there is no gain for a voter in making a legislator less senior, and the voter thus best
responds by always reelecting her representative.
Calculations for Example 3
Calculations for the example.
Row 1: The rules proposer is recognized as policy proposer with probability N+1
2N =
16
30
= 0.533. Her payoﬀ is
8
15
N + 1
2N
+
7
15
1
2
1
N
=
8
15
8
15
+
7
450
= 0.3.
Senior and semi-senior legislators are recognized with probability 1
15
. Their payoﬀ is
1
15
16
30
+ 14
15
1
2
1
15
= 0.067.
Junior legislators are never recognized. Their payoﬀ is 1
2
1
15
= 0.03.
Row 2: The rules proposer and senior legislators are recognized with probability
1− 3
15
5
= 4
25
= 0.16. Their payoﬀ is 4
25
8
15
+ 21
25
1
2
1
15
= 0.113 . Semi-senior legislators are
recognized with probability 1
15
and their payoﬀ is as in row one; junior legislators are
never recognized and their payoﬀ is as in row 1.
Row 3: Recognition probabilities are as in row one, but expected payoﬀs now
coincide with these probabilities.
Row 4: The probability x of recognition for semi-senior legislators is
(N + 3)θlt(N + 1− 2θlt)− 4N
4Nθlt − 2N(N + 1) +N(N + 1)θlt(N + 1− 2θlt)
=
18(5)(6)− 60
300− 30(16) + 15(16)5(6) = 0.068.
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The probability of recognition z for senior legislators is:
z =
1
θlt
+ x
µ
2θlt −N − 1
2θlt
¶
=
1
5
+ 6. 837 6× 10−2(10− 16
10
) = 0.159.
Expected payoﬀs for senior legislators are:
(1− 0.159(16
18
)− (1− 0.159) 2
18
− (16
2
− 5) 1
15
)/4 = 0.141 .
Expected payoﬀ for the proposer is
1− 4 ∗ 0.141 − 0.2 = 0.235 .
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